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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RANDY OLSEN, by and through his Guardian 
ad Litem, Gaylen R. Olsen, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION; THE STATE 
OF UTAH, by and through its ROAD COM-
MISSION; and FLOWELL ELECTRICAL AS-
SOCIATION, INC, a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION; THE STATE 
OF UTAH, by and through its ROAD COM-
MISSION, Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
COX CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., 
Third-Party Defendant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, FLOWELL 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant claims damages for injuries suffered in 
the course of his employment in highway construction. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Salt Lake County District Court, the Honor-
able G. Hal Taylor, Judge, presiding, granted summary 
judgment in favor of respondent Flowell Electrical As-
sociation on May 24, 1974. The appellant filed a mo-
Case No. 
13867 
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tion to vacate that summary judgment on July 12, 1974, 
which motion was denied by Judge Taylor in an order 
entered July 29,1974. 
Respondent State of Utah obtained a summary judg-
ment on October 8, 1974, the Honorable Maurice Hard-
ing, presiding. 
Appellant filed Notice of Appeal from all summary 
judgments on October 23,1974. 
• A BELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Flowell seeks affirmance of the sum-
mary judgment below and dismissal of the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of facts requires some ampli-
fication in order to understand fully the undisputed cir-
cumstances. 
Flowell is a small rural electrification association 
in Millard County operated by Ralph Robinson, its man-
ager, two fieldmen, and a part time bookkeeper. 
Cox Construction crews had been constructing 1-15 
through Millard County for about a year before the ac-
cident. During that time, Cox personnel became ac-
quainted with Ralph Robinson of Flowell. (Cox Deposi-
tion pp. 8-12) Cox was aware that Robinson's home 
and business telephone numbers were listed in the local 
directory. (Cox Deposition pp. 25, 89) A telephone was 
located in Cox's trailer within 2 blocks of the accident 
site. (Cox Deposition pp. 8, 79) 
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About a week before the accident Cox contacted 
Eobinson concerning anticipated work in the vicinity 
of the power lines. Cox described the arrangements as 
follows: 
"Mr. Eobinson said that he had quite a few cus-
p tomers on the line; if there was any way pos-
, sible that we could pour this concrete without 
cutting the power, he would appreciate it, I told 
him that we had talked to the company in Salt 
Lake City about using the concrete pump, which 
would eliminate any movement in the area of 
equipment under the power lines, or would be a 
safety measure that we could take. 
"Q. What did he say? 
"A. He thought that was a real good idea and 
he told me to let him know if we needed any help.'' 
(Cox Deposition p. 15) 
"We talked about the possibility that the power 
might have to be cut. And under those circum-
stances of using our crane, this was discussed. 
I asked him if the power could be cut if we needed 
it, and Ealph told me that he had customers on 
the line, and if it was at all possible to use this 
concrete pump, then it wouldn't be necessary to 
cut the power. 
"Q. O.K. Are you saying that you are going 
to get to Ealph when and if you wanted the power 
cut? 
"A. Yes." (Cox Deposition p. 21) 
"Q. Did you tell Ealph that you would get to 
him when you wanted the power cut ? 
"A. Yes. 
"A. Under the circumstances of our conversa-
tion, I believe I told Ealph that if it was neces-
sary, I would contact him.'' (Cox Deposition p. 22) 
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"Q. As far as your understanding was con-
cerned, before this accident there was no under-
standing on your part that Mr. Robinson would 
cut the power without receiving word from you? 
"A. Yes." (Cox Deposition p. 23) 
"Q. Well, did Mr. Robinson tell you that he 
would be available at all times for the purpose 
* of assisting in this matter. 
"A. Not to my knowledge. 
"Q. Mr. Cox, if you decided that you wanted 
to have the electricity killed on those wires how 
were you going to accomplish that ? 
"A. Well, I would call Mr. Robinson, either in 
his office or in his home." (Cox Deposition p. 89) 
The day before the accident Cox told appellant 
Olsen: 
" . . . we would be working around these wires 
and possibly we would be working around them 
or underneath them, because I planned on using 
the pump for that whole pour. I didn't plan on 
using the crane. But I mentioned to them that 
among the other electrical generators and vibra-
tors, that we would be working around the elec-
tricity and underneath the high tension wires, 
and made known these wires presence across that 
stretch.'' (Cox Deposition p. 65) 
About a week after Cox had last talked with Rob-
inson, Cox crews positioned the pump and 2 or 3 cement 
trucks for the pour,, After an hour of trying to use 
the pump, Cox realized it would not work. (Cox Deposi-
tion p. 27) If the pump had been used it would not 
have come near the power lines. (Cox Deposition p. 96) 
Cox then had the crane positioned on the north side of 
4 
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the over-pass to handle the pour. About 15 to 20 min-
utes after Cox realized the pump was not going to work, 
he drove into Fillmore to try to locate Eobinson. It took 
about 10 minutes for the drive. When he got into the 
Flowell office he found no one was there. He then rode 
down main street "to see if I could see the truck any 
place. I couldn't see any of their employees or any 
equipment, so I turned around and went back to the job 
site." The trip took about 30 minutes. This occurred 
sometime between 10:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon. Cox did 
not attempt to telephone Flowell's office or Robinson's 
home or to make other inquiry. (Cox Deposition pp. 24, 
25, 27, 32) 
When Cox returned to the job site he found that 
the crane had poured two or three buckets. The pour 
continued on the north side for about one hour before 
Cox had the crane moved to the south side. (Cox Depo-
sition pp. 35, 36, 60) In this position about 50 passes 
were made by the crane. (Cox Deposition pp. 63, 64) 
All concerned were aware of the hazards if the boom 
contacted the power lines. They tried to keep the boom 
as flat or as near parallel to the ground as they could. 
(Cox Deposition pp. 67, 68, 93) Generally the boom 
did not come closer than 20 feet to the lines. (Cox De-
position p. 38) Although Mr. Rasmussen, the state's 
representative on the job, had not required or requested 
that Cox have the power turned off, he did ask the Cox 
crew to move the crane on two occasions shortly before 
the accident. (Cox Deposition pp. 84, 85; Rasmussen De-
position p. 129) Just before the accident Cox told his 
crew: 
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" ( I ) didn't want them to go any further to the 
east and wanted them to stay in exactly the same 
position that they had previously been, just prev-
iously dumped a bucket of concrete, and I wanted 
them to dump it in the exact same place, and 
they would probably have to do a little bit more 
shoveling that way, but that I felt this was neces-
sary." (Cox Deposition pp. 68, 69) 
About 5 to 10 minutes before the accident Cox told 
the crane operator that "he would probably have to 
move the crane." Cox planned to have the crane moved 
after dumping the bucket which was being poured when 
the accident occurred. (Cox Deposition pp. 71, 72) 
The boom contacted the power line and power surged 
into the plaintiff who was not wearing rubber boots or 
gloves. (Cox Deposition pp. 78, 104, 105) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AS A MATTER OF LAW FLOWELL WAS 
NOT NEGLIGENT. 
Appellant contends that Flowell should have as-
signed an employee to the job site. The schedule for 
the pour under the power lines was indefinite until the 
day before the accident. It would be completely unrea-
sonable to expect or require Flowell or any utility to 
have a representative continuously located at the con-
struction site waiting indefinitely for possible needs to 
develop, nor was any such request made by Cox or the 
state representative on the job site. Rather, all con-
cerned were satisfied with the normal arrangements: 
if and when it looked like Cox crews would be using a 
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crane in close proximity to the power lines, then Flowell 
would be contacted by Cox before that event. Until the 
morning of the accident and the failure of the pump to 
function, there was no use of or plan by Cox Construc-
tion to use the crane in close proximity to the power 
lines. The plan was to use a pump. A pump was used. 
The pump failed. The crane was placed in operation. 
Thereafter Cox made a brief, belated effort to contact 
Robinson, and state representatives cautioned the Cox 
crew to move the crane away from the power lines. Cox 
controlled the situation. Cox obviously was going to, 
and did, proceed with the use of the crane whether Rob-
inson was immediately available or not. Robinson cer-
tainly required some time to complete whatever he was 
doing and respond to any request to turn off the power 
at the construction site and make appropriate arrange-
ments for other power users who would be affected by 
any power shut down. Robinson had no reason to think 
that Cox would not contact him substantially before any 
need arose to shut off power or that Cox would not hold 
up or adjust its operations until Robinson was advised 
and had an opportunity to respond. 
It is not true, as appellant alleges, that on the morn-
ing of the accident there was any probability that the 
crane would be operated close to the power lines or that 
Robinson had any reason to expect that such would take 
place before Cox contacted Robinson as promised. If, 
as appellant contends, Flowell was bound to anticipate 
negligent conduct of construction crews in the presence 
of state representatives, then Flowell would become an 
insurer of all persons injured by its power lines. The 
7 
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Industrial Commission regulations did not require, nor 
did the state representatives or Cox request or require, 
a Flowell representative to be present at the construc-
tion site on the morning of the accident. Foresight, not 
hindsight, is the test. 
As a matter of law, Flowell was in no wise negli-
gent and did not cause this accident. 
In Pascoe v. Southern California Edison, 102 Ca.2d 
254, 227 P.2d 555 (1951) a contractor notified the power 
company that in the course of its widening a highway 
it would blast underneath high tension wires but did not 
specify date on which blasting would actually occur nor 
request a shut off of electricity. The court held that the 
power company had no legal duty to act on the notifica-
tion when received or six weeks later when blasting oc-
curred, and power company was not negligent in the 
electrocution of contractor's employee. 
POINT II 
THE NEGLIGENCE OF COX CONSTBTTC-
TION COMPANY WAS THE SOLE PEOXI-
MATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
The instant case is not distinguishable with respect 
to proximate cause from Toma v. Utah Power & Light, 
121 U.2d 278, 365 P.2d 788 (1961). Here, and in Toma, 
the contractor knew that the power had not been turned 
off, although means had been arranged to do so, namely, 
by notifying the power company in advance of need. 
In Toma, although this court necessarily assumed for 
purposes of appeal that the power company had re-
jected a specific request by the contractor to turn off 
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the power and was thus negligent, the court nonetheless 
affirmed that the crane operator's negligence was the 
sole proximate. The facts in the instant case are even 
stronger in that here the appellant does not contend that 
Flowell had been requested to turn off the power. 
Appellant argues that a question of fact exists as 
to whether Flowell had a duty to foresee that at some 
indefinite time Cox Construction would not use the 
pump, would use the crane, would not further contact 
Flowell, and would use the crane in close proximity to 
the power lines despite warnings from state represen-
tatives. Such anticipation defies common sense and ex-
perience. 
The full responsibility and control of the situation 
was in the hands of Cox Construction Company, an ex-
perienced and professional operation. The acts and 
omissions of Cox Construction Company were the sole 
proximate cause of the accident. See Merlo v. Public 
Service, 45 N.E.2d 665 (1942); Isbell v. Union Light, 
Heat & Power, 162 Fed. Supp. 471 (1958); and Malatesta 
v. Atlantic City and S. R. Company, 96 A. 54 (1915). 
POINT III 
THE APPELLANT FAILED TO TIMELY 
APPEAL THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOE OF FLOWELL. 
The summary judgment in favor of Flowell was a 
final judgment within the provisions of Article VIII, 
Section 9 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and 
the provisions of Rule 72(a) and 73(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
9 
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That summary judgment finally disposed of all the 
issues between appellant and Flowell. Appellant's cause 
of action against Flowell was separate from and in no 
way dependent upon the plaintiff's causes of action 
against the State of Utah. The appellant therefore is 
obligated to file any appeal within one month of the 
final adjudication. See Springer Transfer Co. v. Board 
of Commissioners, 43 N.M. 444, 94 P.2d 977 (1939); 
Attorney General of Utah v. Pomeroy, 93 U. 426, 73 P.2d 
1277 (1937); 4 Am.Jur. 2d, Appeal & Error, §§ 53 and 
54; and Shurte v. Thorley, 90 U. 381, 61 P.2d 1262. 
The appellant failed to appeal Flowell's summary 
judgment of May 24, 1974 until October 24, 1974, more 
than one month later. 
CONCLUSION 
The court should affirm the summary judgment in 
favor of Flowell because Flowell was not negligent and 
the sole proximate cause of the accident was the negli-
gence of Cox Construction. Appellant's appeal of the 
Flowell summary judgment should be dismissed because 
that appeal was not timely filed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAY E. JENSEN 
CHRISTENSEN, GARDINER, 
JENSEN & EVANS 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent Flowell Electrical 
Association, Inc. 
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